The Mandriva Security Team has published a new security update: MDKSA-2005:127-1 - Updated mozilla-thunderbird packages fix multiple vulnerabilities for Mandriva Linux. Here the announcement:

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

_______________________________________________________________________

Mandriva Linux Security Update Advisory
_______________________________________________________________________

Package name: mozilla-thunderbird
Advisory ID: MDKSA-2005:127-1
Date: August 26th, 2005
Original Advisory Date: July 28th, 2005
Affected versions: 10.2
______________________________________________________________________

Problem Description:

A number of vulnerabilities were reported and fixed in Thunderbird 1.0.5
and Mozilla 1.7.9. The following vulnerabilities have been backported
and patched for this update:

The native implementations of InstallTrigger and other XPInstall-
related javascript objects did not properly validate that they were
called on instances of the correct type. By passing other objects,
even raw numbers, the javascript interpreter would jump to the wrong
place in memory. Although no proof of concept has been developed we
believe this could be exploited (MFSA 2005-40).

moz_bug_r_a4 reported several exploits giving an attacker the ability
to install malicious code or steal data, requiring only that the user
do commonplace actions like clicking on a link or open the context
menu. The common cause in each case was privileged UI code ("chrome")
being overly trusting of DOM nodes from the content window. Scripts in
the web page can override properties and methods of DOM nodes and
shadow the native values, unless steps are taken to get the true
underlying values (MFSA 2005-41).

Additional checks were added to make sure Javascript eval and Script
objects are run with the privileges of the context that created them,
not the potentially elevated privilege of the context calling them in
order to protect against an additional variant of MFSA 2005-41
(MFSA 2005-44).

In several places the browser UI did not correctly distinguish between
true user events, such as mouse clicks or keystrokes, and synthetic
events genenerated by web content. The problems ranged from minor
annoyances like switching tabs or entering full-screen mode, to a
variant on MFSA 2005-34 Synthetic events are now prevented from
reaching the browser UI entirely rather than depend on each potentially
spoofed function to protect itself from untrusted events
(MFSA 2005-45).

Scripts in XBL controls from web content continued to be run even when
Javascript was disabled. By itself this causes no harm, but it could be
combined with most script-based exploits to attack people running
vulnerable versions who thought disabling javascript would protect
them. In the Thunderbird and Mozilla Suite mail clients Javascript is
disabled by default for protection against denial-of-service attacks
and worms; this vulnerability could be used to bypass that protection
(MFSA 2005-46).

When InstallVersion.compareTo() is passed an object rather than a
string it assumed the object was another InstallVersion without
verifying it. When passed a different kind of object the browser would
generally crash with an access violation. shutdown has demonstrated
that different javascript objects can be passed on some OS versions to
get control over the instruction pointer. We assume this could be
developed further to run arbitrary machine code if the attacker can get
exploit code loaded at a predictable address (MFSA 2005-50).

A child frame can call top.focus() even if the framing page comes from
a different origin and has overridden the focus() routine. The call is
made in the context of the child frame. The attacker would look for a
target site with a framed page that makes this call but doesn't verify
that its parent comes from the same site. The attacker could steal
cookies and passwords from the framed page, or take actions on behalf
of a signed-in user. This attack would work only against sites that use
frames in this manner (MFSA 2005-52).

Parts of the browser UI relied too much on DOM node names without
taking different namespaces into account and verifying that nodes
really were of the expected type. An XHTML document could be used to
create fake <IMG> elements, for example, with content-defined
properties that the browser would access as if they were the trusted
built-in properties of the expected HTML elements. The severity of the
vulnerability would depend on what the attacker could convince the
victim to do, but could result in executing user-supplied script with
elevated "chrome" privileges. This could be used to install malicious
software on the victim's machine (MFSA 2005-55).

Improper cloning of base objects allowed web content scripts to walk up
the prototype chain to get to a privileged object. This could be used
to execute code with enhanced privileges (MFSA 2005-56).

The updated packages have been patched to address these issue.

Update:

There was a slight regression in the handling of "right-click" menus in
the packages previously released that is corrected with this new
update.
_______________________________________________________________________

References:

http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-2260
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-2261
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-2265
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-2266
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-2269
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-2270
http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/mfsa2005-40.html
http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/mfsa2005-41.html
http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/mfsa2005-44.html
http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/mfsa2005-45.html
http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/mfsa2005-46.html
http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/mfsa2005-50.html
http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/mfsa2005-52.html
http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/mfsa2005-55.html
http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/mfsa2005-56.html
http://secunia.com/advisories/15549/
______________________________________________________________________

Updated Packages:

Mandrakelinux 10.2:
dc5d6c3678f46e575bdc215ac7aa00e3 10.2/RPMS/mozilla-thunderbird-1.0.2-3.1.102mdk.i586.rpm
d3a4170ba3535057621ee85712bacc8d 10.2/RPMS/mozilla-thunderbird-devel-1.0.2-3.1.102mdk.i586.rpm
76b14e777bffb3c9f6bfde915f79a2ad 10.2/RPMS/mozilla-thunderbird-enigmail-1.0.2-3.1.102mdk.i586.rpm
77717fb74315ae1bb54dfea91d053441 10.2/RPMS/mozilla-thunderbird-enigmime-1.0.2-3.1.102mdk.i586.rpm
da50dfbc83a1cb3067479eada1727d4e 10.2/SRPMS/mozilla-thunderbird-1.0.2-3.1.102mdk.src.rpm

Mandrakelinux 10.2/X86_64:
da471fbf66c976861717e0264fc46aaf x86_64/10.2/RPMS/mozilla-thunderbird-1.0.2-3.1.102mdk.x86_64.rpm
6baf58a3cb334c6179f8d47c8255ac43 x86_64/10.2/RPMS/mozilla-thunderbird-devel-1.0.2-3.1.102mdk.x86_64.rpm
b35aaa288786860f96d4beb4b574db63 x86_64/10.2/RPMS/mozilla-thunderbird-enigmail-1.0.2-3.1.102mdk.x86_64.rpm
3728bee246d6e9aad8181e1d7529913d x86_64/10.2/RPMS/mozilla-thunderbird-enigmime-1.0.2-3.1.102mdk.x86_64.rpm
da50dfbc83a1cb3067479eada1727d4e x86_64/10.2/SRPMS/mozilla-thunderbird-1.0.2-3.1.102mdk.src.rpm
_______________________________________________________________________

To upgrade automatically use MandrakeUpdate or urpmi. The verification
of md5 checksums and GPG signatures is performed automatically for you.

All packages are signed by Mandriva for security. You can obtain the
GPG public key of the Mandriva Security Team by executing:

gpg --recv-keys --keyserver pgp.mit.edu 0x22458A98

You can view other update advisories for Mandriva Linux at:

http://www.mandriva.com/security/advisories

If you want to report vulnerabilities, please contact

security_(at)_mandriva.com
_______________________________________________________________________

Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID
pub 1024D/22458A98 2000-07-10 Mandriva Security Team
<security*mandriva.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.4 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQFDD6BQmqjQ0CJFipgRAgJwAKCZCX6193rZE/XMzsMbRN22zw/AaACghZhl
d68FgQMXjMnePY/XsKwLPj4=
=by5I
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----